The Social Partner Dispute - A Nordic Perspective by Poulsen, Casper & Szpisjak, Aron
 
 
 
 
Standard front page for projects, subject module 
projects and master theses 
 
Compulsory use for all projects and master theses on the following subjects: 
  
• International Studies 
• International Development Studies 
• Global Studies 
• Erasmus Mundus, Global Studies – A European Perspective 
• Public Administration 
• Social Science 
• EU studies 
• Public Administration, MPA 
 
User’s manual on the next page. 
 
Project title:  
The Social Partner Dispute – A Nordic Perspective 
Project seminar 
 
Prepared by (Name(s) and study number): Kind of project: Module: 
Casper Poulsen Bachelor BA 
Aron Szpisjak Bachelor BA 
   
   
   
   
Name of Supervisor:  
Jane Widtfeldt Meged 
Submission date:  
2015/05/25 
Number of keystrokes incl. spaces (Please look at the next page): 
112187 
Permitted number of keystrokes incl. spaces cf. Supplementary Provisions (Please look at 
the next page): 
96000-144000 
 
 
 
The Social Partner Dispute – A Nordic Perspective by Casper Poulsen and Aron Szpisjak 
 
Abstract 
This project was written in cooperation with 3F - the largest trade union in Denmark. There have 
not been any studies conducted on the social partners dispute in the ILO from 2012 hence our 
motivation to provide insights on the impasse. During the dispute the supervisory system of the 
ILO ceased to function in terms of striking cases. This paper aims to present feasible permanent 
solutions to resolve the issue between the social partners. This is done by analyzing the organiza-
tional change that the International Labor Organization is seemingly experiencing by utilizing a 
theoretical framework by Barnett and Finnemore. We have found that there is indeed an organiza-
tional change in the tripartite structure of the ILO which emanated from the inside. We propose a 
bestowal of legal competences by the International Court of Justice upon the Committee of Experts 
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. This would provide the ILO with an 
in-house mechanism of dealing with similar issues like this in the future.  
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Contextualization 
This chapter has the foremost purpose of presenting key research elements, which will be re-
ferred to throughout the paper. A presentation of concepts, groups and ideas relevant to the Re-
search Question will take also take place in this section.  
Introduction 
A short introduction to the ILO and its historical background. What happened prior to the social 
partners’ dispute, and why has this motivated us to research this phenomenon in cooperation 
with 3F fagligt fælles forbund? 
 
To understand the International Labour Organization (ILO), its ideals, actors and the conflicts it 
faces, we must first grasp how it came into existence. The ILO was an outcome of the Versailles 
Treaty in 1919 that ended World War I. The ideas were that an institution, provided with a man-
date from member states, could efficiently promote social justice. The belief was that universal 
and lasting peace could be accomplished through social justice, and therefore the ILO become an 
essential part of the Peace Treaty (ILO.org, 2015). The Labour commission, which was the first 
organ in the ILO, established the tripartite system as the first of its kind, representing Employers, 
Workers and Governments. To secure a stable international society, in which social justice pre-
vailed, the ILO had to deal with the Injustice forms of labor (ILO.org, 2015). This injustice, 
would eventually produce unrest, which could be the cause of effect, once again resulting in war.  
Taken into account these beliefs, the ILO had to focus on rights of work, social rights and the 
promotion thereof - to be successful.  
Today, the ILO has developed and implemented hundreds of conventions in the international le-
gal system, and is mostly recognized for its eight fundamental/core conventions. The most suc-
cessful being the convention on the abolition of child labor.  
Naturally, there have been disputes in the tripartite organ, mostly between the social partners as 
is expected. The employers yearning for less regulation, whereas the workers display the oppo-
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site agenda. However, the social partners have always managed to solve these disputes with so-
cial dialogue. Social dialogue has quite often improved the consensus format of the tripartite, in 
that it furthers a mutual recognition and conformity with the ILO ideals.  
 
This research project is motivated by, the perhaps, most critical dispute amongst the social part-
ners in history, the 2012 dispute. >>Can the ILO once again solve this with the means of social 
dialogue, or is this going to lead to the ILO experiencing an organizational change? Below is an 
organizational presentation of the ILO to provide a brief overview of the structure. 
 
Figure 1 
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The Dispute 
 
Figure 2 - Timeline of Dispute 
The dispute can be dated back to the 1994 General Survey, where the employer’s representation 
henceforth; (ER), voiced their concerns over the wording of Convention 87 (referred to as C.87 
from now) and the fact that it does not include the right to strike. However, nothing had been 
done about the issue while it also did not cease normal operations at the ILO. That is until in July 
2012 the tripartite system experienced, what is referred to as a “Deadlock” by employers, and as 
an “attack on the universality of rights” by workers. In the summer of 2012 the employer's repre-
sentation questioned the competences of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Con-
ventions and Recommendations (CEACR) in regards to their interpretation of Convention 87 and 
98 (C.87 and C.98 thusly). The ER state that the CEACR has extensively interpreted C.87 as to 
provide a universal right to strike (Do ILO Conventions 87 and 98 recognize a right to strike?, 
2014).  
This caused an impasse in the work of the Committee of Application of Standards, CAS as well 
as the in CEACR.  The CAS is a standing committee of the International Labour Conference, 
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ILC, it consists of government, employer, and worker delegates. Its objective is described as” ex-
amines the report in a tripartite setting and selects from it a number of observations for discus-
sion”. (ILO.org, 2015).  
The dilemma and disagreement became even more explicit at the ILC in 2012, due to the general 
survey provided by CAS on the ILO’s core conventions (C.87: Freedom of Association being 
one of them). This opportunity was seized by the ER to support their argument of a too extensive 
interpretation from the supervisory system, namely the CEACR. This was heavily discussed in 
the application committee at the ILC - resulting in a ‘break down’ - “they could not agree on the 
list of cases. Then it was decided that it should go to the governing body (Lorentzen, T, 2015). 
However, the Governing Body was not prepared for this discussion, causing the ILC in 2012 to 
be somewhat turbulent.  
 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR) and their mandate 
The supervisory system at the ILO, is composed of various institutions, each with an objective in 
regards to monitoring or supervising the implementation of ILO principles and conventions in 
MS.  
The CEACR (also referred to as the expert committee) is an integral part of the supervisory sys-
tem in ILO. Its main purpose is to engage in a dialogue with member states (MS) on the matters 
of application of ratified conventions. This implies that a member state, who has ratified a con-
vention, commits itself to engage in close dialogue with the CEACR - this results in a shared in-
formation setting, i.e - informing the ILO which measures that has been taken to ensure that the 
convention has had an impact on a practical level (ILO.org, 2015). Information can also be sub-
mitted by the social partners on the matters of the application of ratified conventions. Typically a 
MS is obliged to report to the supervisory system in an interval of 1-5 years. As the ILO is a tri-
partite system, both social partners and the governing body play an important role in monitoring 
the application and implementation of conventions.  
 
Page 8 of 60 
 
The Social Partner Dispute – A Nordic Perspective by Casper Poulsen and Aron Szpisjak 
 
The CEACR was set up by the Governing Body with the resolution adopted by the International 
Labour Conference (ILC) in 1926. Its purpose is examining whether member states are abiding 
by the conventions and recommendations that they ratified. The governments send reports to the 
CEACR which are then reviewed by the 20 high-level jurist members. The CEACR is composed 
of 20 jurists, who are appointed by the Governing body (GB) for a renewable period of three 
years. They come from various regions, thus portraying different legal cultures, making them im-
partial (ILO.org, 2015) but also possess the required technical competence. Therefore, the mem-
bers of the CEACR are not representative of the governments they are nationals of. Since they 
are appointed by the GB but recommended by the Director-General himself and not by the na-
tional governments, it gives them credibility as being independent (Gravel and Charbonneau-
Jobin, 2003). 
 
“In its evaluation of the conformity of national legislation, the Committee of Experts exercises a 
competence which has often been qualified as quasi-judicial, even though it is not a tribunal.” 
(Gravel and Charbonneau-Jobin, 2003, pg. 9). 
 
Therefore, the question arises whether or not the interpretation of the CEACR are actually le-
gally binding. This question is an important aspect of this paper that will be discussed in greater 
detail. Despite the fact that they are interpreting international labor standards and laws it is by 
virtue of article 37 of the ILO Constitution that only the International Court of Justice can make 
a so-called “definitive interpretation” of the ILO Conventions (Gravel and Charbonneau-Jobin, 
2003). 
 
Additionally they provide technical evaluation of application of international labor standards 
(ILS) in member states. So how does the supervisory system function, what is their mandate in 
an ILO context? - these are but some of the points discussed and elaborated on in this paper. 
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The Joint Statement 
A possible way forward? 
Three years had passed since the break out of the conflict between the social partners. The gov-
ernments had for some time expressed a frustration towards the unresolved dispute, and in Feb-
ruary 2015, they decided to react by publishing a statement (Ohrt, J, 2015). However, mean-
while, the social partners had met for a small, unofficial settlement, referred to as the “Peace Ne-
gotiation” - (Rønnest, J. 2015). The outcome of this meeting was “The Joint Statement”. It tells 
the story of a settlement between to two partners, at least until November 2016. The matter of the 
right to strike was switched out with the right to take “industrial action”. Both workers and em-
ployers are positive about this step. However, historically, disputes are settled by compromises 
between the social partners, but now governments already stated their point. The Nordic coun-
tries along with the EU put out a combined statement: “There is a global right to strike” (Inter-
national Labour Organization, 2015). The Nordic governments were frustrated at first, but they 
soon realized the positive elements of The Joint Statement (Ohrt, J. 2015). The Joint Statement 
also included the creation of a new body of the ILO called the Standard Review Mechanism. 
This was set up by the Governing Body to revise outdated or obsolete Conventions, Recommen-
dations and Protocols. However, this excludes the Fundamental Conventions from being revised. 
Therefore, one can questions whether the Joint Statement is actually a solution.  
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Problem Area 
The impasse from 2012-2015 is the main object of interest in this paper. This dispute has been a 
problematic event in the work of ILO’s supervisory system, impacting the labor standards and 
regulations worldwide. All members of the tripartite has expressed a concern for this impasse, 
and attempts has also been made to optimize the situation, namely The Disclaimer in 2013 and 
the Joint Statement in 2015. 
Nevertheless, the legitimacy of ILO’s supervisory system has been challenged, and to some ex-
tent, forced to review and define their mandate. According to workers, the ILO cannot function 
without the supervisory system, in the sense that it is the only legal body of the ILO, connecting 
Member States (MS) with ILO. (Ohrt, J. 2015). 
It is furthermore a worry for trade unions across Europe, an example is the Danish trade union 
3F, who provided us with the question: “What is the background for this development we experi-
ence in the ILO, and how can we solve it - maintaining the right to strike, as a universal right? 
(Lyngse, 2015).  
This gives rise to a discussion of the tripartite structure, the social partners and the future of ILO. 
What credible explanations can be formulated, in regards to the dispute on the matters of C.87 - 
Freedom of association? How can a fundamental right, recognized and legally binding for all 
member states, be questioned? Why is it happening now, who are the key actors and what inter-
ests is guiding them? These are but some questions which will be touched upon in this research 
project.  
 
In a cooperation with 3F Fagligt Fælles Forbund, we will investigate the cause and effects of the 
2012-2015 dispute, as well as provide credible explanations to the tendencies shaping the dis-
course by ILO actors - which has led to this research question: 
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Research Question 
Is the dispute between the social partners a consequence of an organizational 
change in the International Labour Organization, if so, why and what could be a 
permanent solution? 
Working Questions 
 
1. What are the competences of the ILO system and how is it structured?  
      1. A Does this structure hinder it from furthering its original mission? 
This will assist us in elucidating how efficient the tripartite construction is along with the 
competences of the expert committees. 
 
2. How did the social partners, through the Joint Statement, reclassify the discussion 
of the CEACR mandate and is this a sign of organizational change? 
What happens if the ILO is experiencing institutional stagnation; a perspective from so-
cial partners and the Governing Body? 
 
3. How may solutions be applied to solve this dilemma between employer and workers 
at the ILO level? 
How can a consensus - based institution move forward from such a stagnation and dis-
pute? Analyzing and discussing the discourse from the social partners through interviews 
and documental analysis. 
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Theoretical framework 
This section will elaborate on the applied theories, as well how the interplay between Barnett 
and Finnemore’s framework of Institutional Change and Anthony Giddens’ Theory of Structu-
ration will contribute to the analytical section.  
Introduction 
The theoretical framework of this project will firstly be based on Barnett and Finnemore’s frame-
work of institutional change from their book Rules for the World: International Organizations in 
Global Politics (2004) Their framework presents an alternate way of examining change in inter-
national organizations (IOs) than the commonly used international relations theories do not seem 
to provide much insight into why IOs behave the way they do. Much of the scholarship on organ-
izations generally states that organizations (not necessarily IOs) behave in ways that their crea-
tors did not anticipate. They take on new missions while also adapting unexpectedly to new chal-
lenges therefore they exhibit mission creep. Mission creep is essentially the expansion of a pro-
ject beyond its original goals (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Therefore Barnett and Finnemore 
formulated an alternative approach to understanding IOs. They developed a constructivist ap-
proach to examine IOs as autonomous actors and to help explain their power in global politics. 
The basis of their theoretical framework is that they see IOs as bureaucracies where bureaucracy 
is a “distinctive social form of authority with its own internal logic and behavioral proclivities” 
(Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). It is because of their authority that bureaucracies have sufficient 
autonomy to actually accomplish their goals in changing the world. They use their authority and 
in turn autonomy to set impersonal rules for the world which are used to regulate as well as 
shape and construct the social world. Therefore, IOs use their power of making rules to “create 
new categories of actors, form new interests for actors, define new shared international tasks, 
and disseminate new models of social organization around the globe.” (Barnett and Finnemore, 
2004). They continue to state however that it could be the rules themselves that bring about the 
end of the bureaucracy. It is because bureaucracies often become somewhat obsessed with their 
own rules while losing focus from their original mission (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). 
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By treating IOs as bureaucracies they can examine the four aspects of IO behavior that interna-
tional relations scholars have been debating i.e. autonomy, power, dysfunction and change. To 
delve deeper into these aspects however, we need to highlight what scholars have been focusing 
the debate on. Barnett and Finnemore pose the question whether IOs can actually act aside from 
state interests and if so, how? (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) If we were to look at the majority 
of international relations literature which are focused on state-centric theoretical approaches it 
would quickly become apparent that they do not expect or provide an understanding of autono-
mous IO behavior. These scholars treat IOs as mechanisms of the states that created them as they 
were created to do their bidding essentially. Their skepticism is grounded in the fact that most 
public IOs i.e. the largest ones were created by powerful states and designed to give the powerful 
states a great deal of control over what they can and cannot do. Resources also come into the 
equations as IOs generally do not have a steady revenue hence they are reliant on states. There-
fore, Barnett and Finnemore’s approach to examining IOs by treating them as bureaucracies is 
useful to examine the sources of autonomy for IOs.  
“Bureaucracies are also authorities in their own right, and that authority gives them autonomy 
vis-à-vis states, individuals, and other international actors.” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004)  
-where authority is the ability to induce deference from others. The authority of IOs can come 
from multiple sources. For instance, the IMF has authority in international financial matters - i.e. 
because of the goals they pursue – or it could also be the way that they pursue them. As there are 
many IOs with different goals, authority comes from a multiplicity of sources. They could also 
be promoting human rights, providing financial aid among many others by relying on their credi-
bility as this is essentially the role they were created for. “In addition, because they are bureau-
cracies, IOs carry out their missions by means that are mostly rational, technocratic, impartial, 
and nonviolent.” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). This often points to IOs being more legitimate 
than states who utilize coercive tactics in reaching their own goals. Therefore, their way of han-
dling situations gives them authority in matters where states may not have it. How they use their 
authority however is another interesting question. As IOs are generally created to solve issues 
individual states cannot, they are given a large amount of autonomy as well as a vague set of 
guidelines which need interpretation by the staff of the IO itself (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). 
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The different sources of authority and autonomy will be discussed in detail later on in this chap-
ter. As mentioned before, IOs carry the inevitable flaws of bureaucracies with them e.g. division 
of labor and specialization among staff could result in tunnel vision, impeding the original mis-
sion. This is what Barnett and Finnemore refer to as bureaucratic dysfunction. Lastly, change in 
IOs has been accounted to in conventional IR theories to powerful states, however with Barnett 
and Finnemore’s framework we are looking at IOs as bureaucracies with their own rules and 
goals which are being formulated constantly by themselves. As mentioned before, IOs exhibit 
mission creep, however the change in mission could be the result of states imposing more mis-
sions upon them. However, IOs also exhibit mission creep without exogenous pressure therefore 
there is an unintended process. 
Bureaucracy 
A short account of what bureaucracy actually stands for will be provided in this section to make 
it clear how it is possible to treat IOs as such. They base their definition of bureaucracies on Max 
Weber. 
Modern bureaucracies are defined by four central features. These are; hierarchy, where each in-
dividual on the staff has a clearly defined role and sphere of competence; continuity, where the 
structure of the IO allows advancement on the hierarchy as well as a full-time salary; imperson-
ality, meaning that staff have to abide by the predetermined rules thereby prohibiting any politi-
cal influence; and lastly expertise, meaning staff are selected based on education and merits and 
are trained for their purpose (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Bureaucracies are based on imper-
sonal rules, they are bound by rules as well as the composers of new rules. Bureaucratic rules can 
have four effects that are relevant to studying IOs. Firstly, the rules are affecting both the internal 
of IOs i.e. the staff is bound by it as it is the predefined operating procedure, as well as external 
such as making international labor conventions. Second, these rules provide the internal staff of 
IOs a view of the world as they are defining and categorizing the world by nature. Third, bureau-
crats create rules that allow them to influence the social world as well as create “loopholes” for 
themselves for further intervention. Lastly, the rules actually shape the organization’s identity as 
well as define.  
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Authority 
Authority is a social construction i.e. it cannot and does not exist apart from the social relations 
that constitute it. It requires some form of consent from actors i.e. authority is conferred. There-
fore, these actors that confer authority tend to alter their view or actions to the decisions or rec-
ommendations laid out by the authority. Even though actors confer authority they do not neces-
sarily abide by the guidelines set out by the authority meaning that compliance is not automatic. 
Conferring authority to IOs - them being rational-legal authorities i.e. bureaucracies – is benefi-
cial as they make impersonal rules to classify the world. “Rational-legal authority thus consti-
tutes IOs in the sense that it gives them a specific form (bureaucracy) and empowers them to act 
in specific ways (general, impersonal rule making)” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).   
According to Barnett and Finnemore there are three basic types of authority that IOs can possess; 
delegation, morality, and expertise.  
For IOs, delegated authority derives from the states therefore IOs are authorities because states 
put them in charge of certain missions. IOs represent their entire membership, who also have the 
authority to delegate tasks for the IOs. As mentioned before, authority and autonomy go hand-in 
-hand i.e. if states delegate authority by giving mandates to IOs they do not seem to have a great 
degree of autonomy. However, these mandates are often vague in need of interpretation by the 
staff of IOs, moreover, states give mandates that they themselves cannot accomplish (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004). These thereby call into question whether a state-centric approach would be 
beneficial as the exact reason they conferred authority is because the states cannot accomplish 
the goals individually. This also strengthens the fact that IOs must possess some form of auton-
omy in order to accomplish the goals set forth by the states. “At some level, delegation creates 
autonomy precisely because being autonomous is the mandate.” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). 
As Barnett and Finnemore say, delegated authority is authority on loan. To actually make use of 
it IOs have to abide by the expectations from their creators. It is always difficult for an IO to bal-
ance the tensions between the actual mission and the desires of the states if they are conflicting 
(Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).  
Moral authority stems from the fact that IOs are often created with a shared set of principles and 
are often reliant on these for authoritative action. They often claim to be the protector of the 
community’s interests and goals. The ILO for instance is the protector of worker’s rights with a 
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specific set of shared principles. IOs often state that they are not doing the bidding of powerful 
states but are looking out for the interests of the global community. Thereby, they present them-
selves as depoliticized and impartial authorities. 
IOs are often seen as authoritative because of their expertise in their field. An important point to 
mention here is that bureaucracies are made to fulfill this type of authority as individuals in a bu-
reaucracy are selected by their expertise and education in their respective fields. This type of spe-
cialized knowledge, may it be derived from training or experience, often persuades us to confer 
authority on IOs to make decisions.  
“These four types of authority - rational-legal, delegated, moral, and expert - all contribute in 
different ways to making IOs authoritative and, by virtue of their authority, autonomous to at 
least some degree.” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) It could be a mix of these that provide IOs 
the authority need to accomplish their goals. Barnett and Finnemore argue that IOs can be “in au-
thority” or “an authority” or a mix of these two. A person in authority means that they are just 
occupying the position of someone who is recognized as legitimate to exercise power. While on 
the other hand an authority is someone who is specialized in a specific field by training, educa-
tion, etc.  
Autonomy 
Barnett and Finnemore’s framework proposes five ways in which IOs and states can interact and 
these are: 
1. “IOs may exercise autonomy to further state interests” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). 
This might be done by IOs interpreting rules and their own guidelines in a way to aid 
states in reaching their own interests. These do not necessarily have to be the exact state 
demands but something that will aid them in reaching them. They call this autonomy by 
design meaning that the IO was created for this specific purpose thereby imposing some 
autonomy on them. 
2. There are some policy issues where states do not have a strong mandate or have insuffi-
cient knowledge to act in. IOs may act in this scenario without opposing state interests 
(Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).  
3. The design of IOs as bureaucracies might lead to failing to abide by state demands. This 
might be because of the standard bureaucratic slowness (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). It 
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happens often that bureaucracies make promises that they cannot keep. IOs may also con-
sent to state demands and then continue to fulfill their self-interests. It is also possible 
that IOs outright refuse to carry out mandates which contradict their mission or are 
against their expertise. 
4. IOs going directly against state interests is not highly likely if the state in questions is a 
powerful one. However, IOs often do not hesitate to go against weaker willed states while 
also sometimes hindering interests of powerful ones (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).  
5. IOs may initiate change on the norms of the international scene i.e. aligning the prefer-
ences of states with their own. In more simple terms, IO interests become state interests 
as well. For instance the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights are often given 
the mission to convince states to change their behavior so that they are consistent with 
international law (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). 
Rationalist approaches tend to look for the correlation between what states want and what IOs 
actually do. However, these five scenarios show that that is not the only possibility, therefore fur-
ther examination is needed. 
Powers of International Organizations 
Classification of the World 
A central feature of bureaucracies is that they classify and organize information and the 
knowledge they gathered (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). As an extension IOs are given man-
dates to articulate the problems within their field of influence. For instance human rights was not 
always a concern of the international community until an IO defined it as a problem. The con-
structiveness of Barnett and Finnemore’s approach shows itself in this case as problems are not 
objectively existing but are subjectively defined and created in social experience. Classification 
not only shape how the IOs themselves react to the issue but how the rest of the world deals with 
them as well. 
The Fixing of Meanings 
While IOs focus on classifying the world by labeling issues they also obtain power to fix the 
meaning of those social kinds (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Therefore,  
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“Because actors are oriented toward objects and objectives on the basis of the meaning 
that they attribute to them, the ability to invest situations with a particular meaning con-
stitutes an important source of power.” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) 
As IOs possess the power to fix meanings and set clear boundaries in ways that often inherit ac-
tion from other actors within the boundaries. For instance, in the development field, IOs have the 
crucial task of constantly redefining development as well as who is actually doing the develop-
ment (usually IOs or states) and who is actually in need of development (Barnett and Finnemore, 
2004). They tend to accomplish this through framing where frames “are specific metaphors, 
symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an 
evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action. (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 
1996)” Actors are utilizing frames to create a shared understanding of the world by interpreting 
issues. Therefore, the issues themselves do not have an objective meaning until the actors attach 
meaning thereby also creating boundaries in which to operate (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). 
Diffusion of norms 
IOs are designed to classify the world and try to spread their expert knowledge and models of 
good behavior to the whole world. Many IO officials have stated that their mission is spreading 
and enforcing good social values and norms. They possess the required skills to be the missionar-
ies of modern times as they have an idea how to progress towards a better life as well as under-
standing how this conversion could be made possible (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Further-
more, they attempt to shape state action by creating norms and articulating them well about what 
makes legitimate state behavior (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).  
By doing these three things, IOs also are also enabling themselves to expand further into as well 
as sanctioning their own intervention in issues. Thereby also using their authority to exercise 
their power and influence in the world (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). As IOs are rational legal 
authorities they tend to make solutions that are being carried out by other rational legal authori-
ties. Therefore, IOs rely on other IOs to carry out tasks as well as NGOs and of course, states. “It 
is through their authority to regulate and constitute that IOs are able not only to exercise power 
but also to authorize their own expansion. (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004)” 
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Change in organizations 
According to Barnett and Finnemore, there are 4 ways a change can occur in an IO. These are 
presented in the matrix below;  
 Internal External 
Material resource conflict statist/functionalist 
Cultural bureaucratic form and culture world polity 
Original source: Barnett and Finnemore, 2004 pg. 42 
 
Resource conflict arguments come in two distinct forms. The first one is that organizations will 
tend to strive for resource independence or at least minimize dependence on other organizations. 
In order to accomplish this, organizational leaders such as the Director-General of the ILO will 
develop rules that control their own resources as well as attempt to control resources intended for 
other IOs. The other variation is internal conflict between the different bureaucratic units within 
the IO as they are both struggling for more power and resources. This dispute between the differ-
ent units could possibly lead to the enactment of new rules that might allow one unit to obtain a 
greater role than previously. “Resource conflict models, then, hold that political struggles over 
resources within an organization and between organizations represent the primary source of or-
ganizational change and rule evolution.” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).  
The statist/functionalist arguments are similar to most IR theories on organizational change as 
they assume that state interests are the driving force behind institutional change. Realist argu-
ments claim that ‘Great Power’ interests are the main reason of change while functionalists argue 
that states design IOs with the attempt to further their own agenda and modify them if they steer 
off course (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).  
Social-institutionalists i.e. the world polity box, assume that change comes as a response to nor-
mative change in the environment. The survival of an IO will depend on how they can conform 
to the new normative demands from the outside (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).   
Page 20 of 60 
 
The Social Partner Dispute – A Nordic Perspective by Casper Poulsen and Aron Szpisjak 
 
Lastly, the internal/cultural box showcases bureaucratic culture. In this variation, the shared 
knowledge and understanding of the bureaucratic staff shape the organization itself. Barnett and 
Finnemore state that the theoretical assumption of this box is that IOs are ‘empty vessels’ which 
focus external pressures into functional and applicable action. They put the emphasis on how the 
IO Offices interpret meaning of rules and how they understand their mission and that this all in-
fluences how they react to external pressures (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Bureaucratic cul-
ture claims can be characterized into two different variations. The first one claims that organiza-
tional change tend to be path dependent meaning past decisions tend to shape what decisions can 
be made in the present (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). However, this could also be understood 
as adaptation as much of what bureaucracies do is revising existing rules to conform to present 
standards. The second claim is that bureaucracies are by nature expanding in both size and scope 
of tasks. As bureaucracies mostly operate without outside interruption they are likely to create 
policies and rules that promote rational (in the Weberian sense of the word), impersonal and 
technocratic approaches to their social tasks (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). As mentioned be-
fore, IOs tend to create solutions which requires more intervention by the same IO or other IOs 
thereby abiding by bureaucratic rules of creating rational approaches. 
Theoretical application of Barnett and Finnemore’s Organizational Change. 
There are many concepts within the theoretical framework of Barnett and Finnemore that we 
deem as applicable to the case of the ILO. For instance, the main assumption that IOs are bureau-
cracies fit together with the fact that the ILO is based on universally applicable conventions and 
recommendations. The tripartite structure of the ILO is a unique organizational system whereas it 
seems logical to assess it from a non-state centric theoretical perspective. As the tripartite is the 
exact proof that it is indeed not states that control how the ILO functions but the Office and the 
members of the tripartite. Therefore, this paper present a unique theoretical application by the 
case of the social parties’ dispute on the right to strike.  Furthermore, the case we are examining 
is one of change, however most IR theory assumes that change in an IO can only develop exoge-
nously. The ILO has proved time and time again that it is indeed not only change initiated by 
state pressure that can induce change in an organization but the Office of the ILO can as well as 
the Director-General himself. Another important aspect is that this theoretical framework allows 
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us to see IOs as bureaucracies which could provide some insight as to why the deadlock hap-
pened in the first place. 
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Methods 
An Exploratory Case Study 
This paper takes on the form and objectives of an exploratory case study, in that it attempts to 
give credible explanations to the trends, discourses and events caused by the social partner dis-
pute. Insofar it is a case study that focuses on the causal effects. This does however, not imply 
that description is left out. Description of the ILO and the context hereof, is fundamental to delve 
deeper into the phenomena of interests. The output is however to explain and explore the dispute 
through a triangulation of discourses and perceptions - as well as applying a theoretical frame-
work with an objective of identification of these trends.  
Analytical Strategy 
The following figure is a visual presentation of our analytical strategy.
 
Figure 3 Source: Own Conceptualization 
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A Combined Qualitative approach 
To infer about the trends and events caused by the dispute we, as illustrated on the previous fig-
ure, a combination of participant observation and expert interviews were utilized. This empirical 
data gathering method was complementary, in that it allowed to strengthen our knowledge of the 
expert's’ position, discourses as well as the relevant historical elements of the ILO.  We con-
ducted one interview, followed by the participant observation at the NFC conference -henceforth 
(the conference). The first interview was to a great extent exploratory, and we realized that our 
questions and approach to the next two interviews could be improved, by changing the wording 
of our questions as well as applying more prompts to achieve more precise results.  
We were invited to the conference by 3F, and were given name tags, and titles as 3F representa-
tives. We observed and participated at a moderate level in the discussions and debates. Along the 
process we took field note, to help remember the output from the participants, as well as aiding 
our analysis with the combined data from this observation, ILO reports, process tracing and 
lastly interviews with the key actors of the dispute.  
The primary sources of this report consist of interviews with experts. This type of interview com-
plements the theoretical framework by Barnett & Finnemore. This framework is examined, by 
both structure and individuals who are highly trained in their field - and by extension are experts. 
A definition of an expert will now follow to make it clear what is meant by it. 
 
Definition of “Expert” 
The definition of an expert is very similar to the definition of a bureaucrat in the sense that they 
are in their position because of accumulated experience as well as educational background. An 
expert is considered to be an authority in their respective field, as our theoretical framework also 
assumed (Meuser and Nagel, 1989). Once again, similarly to the theoretical framework these ex-
perts are part of the societal debate and are playing a vital role in the definition of the problems 
(Meuser and Nagel, 1989). In the context of the methodology of this paper however, we consider 
experts as individual who are speaking on behalf of their organizations and are representative of 
them. Other scholarship has referred to this as an ‘elite’ interview.  
Page 24 of 60 
 
The Social Partner Dispute – A Nordic Perspective by Casper Poulsen and Aron Szpisjak 
 
There are three dimensions of expert knowledge, these are; technical knowledge, - very specific 
knowledge in the field, details on operations, laws and such influencing the field - process 
knowledge, - info on the routines of the organization i.e. the expert is directly involved - and ex-
planatory knowledge which is providing subjective interpretations of rules and such. 
 
Induction/Deduction 
We are applying an inductive framework, thus moving from observations, to detecting patterns 
which eventually assist us in formulating hypothesis. The observations stems from the combined 
qualitative approach. It is important to underline that we do not which to develop or claim some 
general conclusions or an theoretical output, but merely an inductive approach which allows to 
give credible explanations to the phenomenon of interest, namely the social partner dispute. 
However, we do intend to confirm our hypothesis and RQ, which indicates deductive elements. 
However the observations are prime sources of empirical evidence in this report, and therefore 
with the reflection of both and inductive and deductive framework the inductive is the most 
prominent approach in this investigation.  
 
Interview profiles 
To investigate the dispute and its background, we conducted 3 expert interview with representa-
tives from all parts of the tripartite system: Employers, Workers and Government Body officials. 
Jørgen Rønnest – Employer (Rønnest, 2015) 
Jørgen Rønnest is currently Director for International Affairs at Danish Employers (Dansk Ar-
bejdsgiverforening). Furthermore he has been spokesperson for the ER in the tripartite, as well as 
spokesperson in the CFA (Committee on Freedom and Association). In 2014 he was also se-
lected as Chairman for the ER in the Government body (GB) in ILO. Mr. Rønnest represents em-
ployers. 
Jens Erik Ohrt –Worker – (Ohrt, 2015) 
Page 25 of 60 
 
The Social Partner Dispute – A Nordic Perspective by Casper Poulsen and Aron Szpisjak 
 
Jens Erik is currently employed at LO (Lønmodtagernes Organisation) in Denmark. Furthermore 
Mr. Ohrt is a regular member of the CFA, and has participated in negotiations and debates with 
the employers, since the dispute came about. Jens Erik Ohrt represents workers. 
 
Torben Lorentzen & Martin Engmann Jensen (Lorentzen, 2015 and Engmann, 2015) 
Both Mr. Lorentzen and Mr. Jensen are employed at the Danish Ministry of Employment, and 
are continuously working with ILO, to secure conformity with the conventions and regulations. 
They represent the Member States position in the Dispute. It must however be mentioned that the 
Nordic Countries, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway are showcasing a highly cooperative 
behavior compared to average of other nations, and therefore their input cannot display a general 
discourse for all member states, but the Nordics. With this in mind, their perception of the dis-
pute has an empirical foundation, which is being targeted in the analysis - as they are speaking as 
government officials.  
 
Semi Structured Interviews 
This project is utilizing a semi-structure interview guide. This was done to get as much data from 
the interviewees as possible. A semi-structured interview guide allows the researcher to deviate 
from the interview questions if the need arises. For instance, in the interview with Jørgen Røn-
nest, many of the questions were left out as he was dominating the interview. However, when his 
answers weren’t concise, we could ask a follow-up question to get a clear answer. As mentioned 
above, when interviewing experts, one can expect that they will dominate the interview because 
of their expert knowledge. Our approach was that we did not attempt to interrupt them but to 
some extent let them guide the interview, in some cases.  
Philosophy of Science 
The theoretical framework provided by Barnett and Finnemore has scientific links to both ra-
tional choice, historical institutionalism as well as contingency theories. In studying an institu-
tion, its conflicts, behavior and output one must reflect how to best place oneself to investigate 
the phenomenon of interest. In this report, we ask  
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RQ Is the dispute between the social partners a consequence of an organizational change in the 
International Labour Organization, if so, why and what could be a permanent solution? 
Thus also hypothesizing that there is an organizational change happening, and it has causal link-
ages to the institutional stagnation we see in the ILO. This will eventually create a causal analy-
sis, which calls for a reflection of the ontology as well as the epistemological standpoint taken in 
this report. As the outline of this report mentions, we aim to give credible explanations to the in-
stitutional stagnation in the ILO, discussing the consequences and the stakes of such a dispute, 
and lastly suggesting solutions. In the theoretical application, the combination of structure, 
agency and organizational change was swiftly touched upon. However, to clarify and provide ar-
guments for the ontological stand, one must take into consideration the spectacles put on when 
answering such a research question. We assume a constructivist discipline in that both structure 
and agency are crucial to understand the phenomenon of interest.  Constructivist also emphasize 
the importance of ideas over material interests, just as Barnett and Finnemore assume an IO also 
has interest in expanding their mandates i.e. increasing their power and not just pursue more 
funding from the member states. Furthermore following a post-modernistic perspective. We once 
again emphasize the importance of structure, thus also recognizing that a hierarchy exist in the 
ILO, and that the structure and hierarchical composition of ILO can be a factor of the Dispute 
from 2012-2015. It also assumes that emancipation from the current structures is needed, in that 
only through a breaking down of barriers, the institution may keep developing (Burns and 
Stalker, 1994). The postmodernist as well as the constructivist views are helpful in understanding 
ILO as an international organization experiencing institutional stagnation, which we assume is 
caused by organizational change. Both the endogenous and exogenous pressures and actions can 
be accounted for by these views, as they take into account structure and agency and their mutual 
impact on organizations.  
 
Additionally we assume a social constructionist epistemology. Following social reality, institu-
tions and ideals therefrom, are shaped by their social context, catalyzing conflicts, solutions as 
well establishing norms and ideas which institutions live by. The social interaction between so-
cial groups and actors, causes a construction of artifacts. The term artifact encompasses the ideas 
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along with information about the particular group’s culture (Watts, 1981). The understanding of 
a social group’s culture is relevant in the sense that culture and discourse are closely related. An-
alyzing the culture and social context of the social partners in ILO, will contribute to an explana-
tion of the social interaction between the two. The social interaction in order words being the dis-
pute amongst the social partners from 2012-2015).  
 
According to Gerard Delanty a social group is always more than its parts (Delanty, 2003). Imply-
ing that IO as ILO are more than just their parts, they have an underlying structure, and is driven 
by certain ideals. In continuation hereof we must also pay respect to the element of social action. 
As it is the social action that establishes the collective identity of social groups. The social 
groups in this case being employers and workers’ representation in the ILO. Following Delanty, 
identity is not an expression of an underlying consciousness, but evermore a reflection and 
recognition of the social actor. This implies that the identity of the actor, in this case the social 
partners, will also change over time. (Delanty, 2003). Social constructionism perceives that 
knowledge can be studied from these interactions, opposing the natural science by stating:   
“The natural world has a small or non-existent role in the construction of scientific knowledge” 
(Collins and Pinch, 1981). 
 
The Philosophy of Science emphasizes the objectives of this paper, in that this report does not 
attempt to give generalized account of international organizations’ behavior, but merely explores 
and explains the social interactions of the actors in the ILO, presented as a case, namely the 
2012-2015 social partner dispute. 
 Hypothesizing that these different cultures are causing the institutional stagnation, and in order 
to provide to solutions and recommendations we must understand this interaction as well as the 
development of ideas and actions in an ILO context.   
Conceptualization/Matrixes 
Throughout the project an essential aim is to give credible explanations on the tendencies, opin-
ions and social context caused by the dilemma between the social partners. Namely causal ef-
fects are processed in matrixes, to provide an analytical framework, and an interpretation thereof. 
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What constitutes the social labels and discourse from both employers and workers? To conceptu-
alize, and explicitly denoting concepts applied by the involved parties, can underpin theoretical 
ideas, as well as to provide explanations of applied discourses in ILO, its structure, effect and 
output. 
 
Institutional Stagnation as a concept 
Challenging the legitimacy of an expert committee was a surprise for both the governing body 
(GB) and workers at the International Labour Conference in 2012. 
The concept Impasse can be related to Laurence R. Helfer paper: Understanding Change in In-
ternational Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in the ILO - 2006”. The tripartite sys-
tem of the ILO was put in an impasse for three years. This gives rise to discuss if the ILO is ex-
periencing an institutional stagnation, as well as how social partners manage these complex is-
sues. To understand the concept of Institutional stagnation, we must first grasp what is meant by 
institutions. Institutions are formal rules that governs a society. In the 19th century institutional 
innovation gave birth to the industrial revolution. This is a fine example to underpin how institu-
tions are not only physical entities which express a certain political agenda- they are foremost 
social entities which enable societies to mobilize. This implies that international organizations 
IO’s can do so internationally. This is however more complicated; one experiences an intercon-
nectedness and interdependent relationship with law. This stems from the question; How can 
IO’s mobilize societies at an international level? They can and do so through law, respectively 
international law. EU law is great example of this - EU law is based on treaties, which are rati-
fied by all member states, ensuring that a region, Europe, are set to follow a universal set of 
rules. The governance is to some extent placed at a domestic level, but the guidelines, recom-
mendations and regulations are set at the international level. The European system is complex, 
however regulations and directives mobilizes the region, and by that also their interconnected so-
cieties.  
Institutions such as the EU and ILO can mobilize societies, they can however only do so through 
a universal set of rules, typically established by international law.  
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The dilemma between social partners, is a dilemma of law measures - therefore institutional stag-
nation as a concept, can be helpful to explain the technicalities of the dispute, the role of 
CEACR, and how grand institutions such as ILO can experience stagnation. In “Understanding 
Change in International Organizations” Helfer (2006) states: 
 
“The different identity of representatives voting for treaties in the ILO and those voting to make 
those treaties binding in domestic law provides a partial explanation for the sparse number of 
ratifications”. 
This implies that social partners has direct participation rights in the ILO, as opposed to the 
rights they have in national legislature. At this level they can only have indirect influence and 
too a great extent must compete with other interest-groups for the attention of the legislators’. 
(Helfer, 2006). This is also an argument for establishing supervisory systems, who can link to the 
member states (MS), to ensure conformity with ILO conventions. This furthermore emphasizes 
the vitality of the expert committees of ILO such as CAS, CEACR and CFA. An argument could 
be made - that institutional stagnation occurs, when the work of these groups are prevented as a 
result of the direct and indirect internal and external pressure. The 60’s and 70’s was a clear ex-
ample of this, when ILO experienced much difficulty with reaching out to socialist as well as de-
veloping countries.  
Further on Helfer also argues that the amended constitution of ILO (both in the 60’s & 70’s), 
provided an incentive for ILO officials to encourage the adoption of treaties which had little 
chance for a global adherence. It required that MS to disclose if they had complied with unrati-
fied conventions, and if there would be any future struggle of compliance. Following, Helfer 
claims: 
 
“..These reports had led many governments to modify their national laws even when they had not 
ratified the treaties nor endorsed the corresponding recommendations. As a result, the adoption 
of conventions with only dim prospects of ratification would nevertheless enhance the authority 
of the ILO Office by providing an additional mechanism for ILO officials to influence state be-
havior”.  
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This supports the worker’s arguments; “Authority and focus must be placed upon ILO offices 
and their officers” (Ohrt, J 2015). This point will be investigated further in chapter 4. It does 
moreover emphasize that the mechanisms of ILO becomes increasingly important over time, as 
they increase their number of members. Another hypothesis could be that”Institutional stagna-
tion occurs when an institution does not invest in its functional mechanisms”  
(these being expert committees and ILO offices) 
 
To summarize, Institutional Stagnation can be utilized in a complementary interplay with Or-
ganizational Change. Barnett and Finnemore helps us classify ILO components, and examined 
them from an internal organizational perspective, whereas the concept of Institutional stagna-
tion, operationalizes the mechanisms of ILO, and assists in explaining the causal effects of the 
exogenous influences from outside actors. 
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Structure & Agency instruments 
To follow up on institutional stagnation, this section explains how the researchers have reflected 
on elements of structure and agency. It is a methodological reflection of how context, as well as 
the agents, can provide an understanding of the social partner dispute. It sums of the basics of 
structure and agency theory, as it is applied in the analysis of this report. 
 
According to Hay (2010), within every social or political context there are displays of agency. 
Such displays are generally stemming from intentional action that has been informed by some 
‘knowledge’ of the structure that define the constraints of said action. This is a requirement for 
effective action which is action that actually reaches the desired effect. When focused on a tasks 
this act becomes a strategy. A strategy is when an objective is selected along with the most ap-
propriate means to reach said objective in a specific context or in a given timeframe. Thus, it is 
important to mention that appropriate strategies change with time (Hay, 2010). Agency therefore 
is the outcome of strategy and intention. This is summarized in the figure below from Hay (2010, 
pg. 190) himself: 
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According to Hay (2010), “the actions of ministers and governments produce the structures that 
constrain junior civil servants and state functionaries, the effects of whose actions similarly con-
strain the rest of us”. This is highly applicable in the case of the ILO as it is essentially the rules 
created by the bureaucrats that constrain the members. Therefore, this method fits with our theo-
retical framework as they both maintain the assumption that the structure of the ILO rests upon 
the rules that the former members created. To further the relevancy of this methodology for this 
paper, Mr. Rønnest and Mr. Ohrt can both be seen as intentional actors as they have both been in 
positions of power or are in them now. They both have a great knowledge of the existing struc-
ture and are therefore exhibiting strategic actions. 
There are 4 positions in the structure - agency debate presented by Hay (2010). These are: The 
structuralist, the intentionalist, structuration and critical realist. A brief presentation of each will 
follow with some emphasis on the position assumed in this paper I. E. Structuration by Giddens.  
Above is a summary of where each tradition is positioned in the debate provided by Hay (2010, 
pg. 193) himself once again. 
 
A structuralist position entails that the focus is on the structure of the analysis. It rejects the no-
tion that agents can have an effect on the observed issue. Alexander Wendt terms this as an 'out-
sider' account of structure - agency as it is staying away from actors and instead is contextualiz-
ing the structure that constrain the actors (Wendt, 1999). This also entails that it operates under a 
monocausal view where the structure exist only to constrain actors and even determine them.  
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On the other hand, intentionalists are the exact opposite where the individual agents are the focus 
of analysis. This position incorporates methodological individualism where the analysis starts 
with an individual and ends with an individual (Hay, 2010). It also operates under monocausal 
view but instead focuses on the actors. This could be themes an 'insider' account just to keep in 
consistent (Hay, 2010). 
Critical realism by Roy Bhaskar is a complex view of structure - agency, in fact it is the most dif-
ficult one to master (Hay, 2010). Opposing the previous approaches, critical realism does not as-
sume a monocausal role but instead approaches it as a dualism of structure and agency (Hay, 
2010). His approach is dualist with having closer ties to structuralism so therefore it is consid-
ered an ‘outsider’. In his own words, “society is both the ever-present condition (material cause) 
and the continually reproduced outcome of human agency” (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 43). 
The fourth position among the debate is structuration theory by Anthony Giddens. Anthony Gid-
dens challenges the presupposed dualistic setting of Agency and Structure. He believes that the 
two concepts, as a framework, should be seen as a duality “Two sides of a coin”. Opposing Criti-
cal Realism, structuration is considered an ‘insider’ as it approaches the debate from the agent’s 
view. According to Giddens structure is perceived as being constituted by rules and resources. In 
an ILO context resources are the mediums in which a certain agenda or discourse is applied. An 
example of this are the epistemic communities or the ILC, in which certain instruments allow so-
cial partners and the GB to set an agenda. Rules are the framework of the bureaucratic ILO set-
ting, they assist in mobilizing the actors, thus making their moves to some extent transparent and 
predictable. With this said the context of rules determines the space in which the actors may nav-
igate.  Whereas agency is the capability to act, and by that Giddens has less focus concept of the 
intentional actor, which agency theorists focus on. He claims that “knowledgeability” character-
izes human agents, in that they are aware of the social rules, which are expressed in the “practi-
cal consciousness” (Giddens, 1984). He further argues: “As social actors, all human beings are 
highly 'learned' in respect of knowledge which they possess, and apply, in the production and re-
production of day-to-day social encounters; the vast bulk of such knowledge is practical rather 
than theoretical in character” (Giddens, 1984). This induces that the actors of whom we speak, 
namely the social partners, are able to produce and reproduce “social items” through their rou-
Page 34 of 60 
 
The Social Partner Dispute – A Nordic Perspective by Casper Poulsen and Aron Szpisjak 
 
tine interactions. The causal link being knowledge of the rules and resources, once again imply-
ing that the methodology as well as the modalities applied by the social partners, become very 
apparent and yet not so dissimilar. A reflection hereof, results in acknowledgment of the im-
portance of Structure, Actor and the Social system/ Bureaucracy created by them. To further ex-
plain this, one must first differentiate between structure and system. According to Giddens we 
must take into account two dimensions; the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic. Syntagmatic can 
be perceived as patterning of social relations, which includes the reproduction of social practices. 
Whereas the paradigmatic dimension revolves around the virtual order of “modes of structur-
ing”. The latter implies that social systems as such are reproduced as social practices, which do 
not have “structure” but instead exhibit structural properties (Giddens, 1984) These properties 
imply that structure exists as a time-space presence , which according to Giddens is:  “only in its 
instantiations in such practices and as memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable 
human agents” (Giddens, 1984). In a simpler wording, society is based on repeated practices that 
are based on rules, however they only exist when they are being used in interaction.  
In the ILO context, one must grasp both dimensions to understand the overlying paradigm, as 
well as the development of social practices. Social practices become then the instruments of the 
actors as well as their routine, determining their social interaction, which ultimately results in a 
structure which is similar to the one of Bureaucracy. In light of this, one may conceive the struc-
tural properties as being hierarchically organized in the time-space extension of practices the ac-
tors recursively organize. (Giddens, 1984).   
 
Limitations 
Our theoretical framework as well as our resources provide some limitations for us. The theoreti-
cal framework by Barnett and Finnemore does not account for outside pressure as much as there 
actually might be external influence on the social partners such as BusinessEurope (this will be 
explained in the analysis). Therefore, this paper does not provide a picture of what is actually 
happening on the global labor market. We cannot account for changes in the global scene as the 
focus of the project is on organizational change initiated from the inside. However, this also en-
tails that we cannot make definitive conclusions on what is actually the driving force behind the 
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organizational change as we are excluding a potentially major factor due to the allocated time 
and resources for this project but also because of the limitations provided by the theoretical 
framework. Another major limitation, as the title of the project hints, is that this is a Nordic per-
spective on the issue as we are situated in Denmark and are mainly gathering data from Scandi-
navian sources. All our interviewees, even though they are representative of their respective or-
ganizations, are Danish and therefore possess somewhat similar values. For instance, if this pro-
ject was conducted in Latin America, where there is not as much unionization as there is in Den-
mark, the outcome could have been slightly different.   
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Analysis 
 
1. What are the competences of the ILO, and how is it structured?  
      1. A Does this structure hinder it from furthering its original mission? 
This will assist us in elucidating how efficient the tripartite construction is along with the 
competences of the expert committees.  
 
The figure (Figure 1) on the right is to provide a visual explanation of the following section. 
The aim of International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) 
is to promote social rights 
related to work. The ILO 
provides internationally 
recognized human and la-
bor rights. The fundamental 
aim stems from an idea that 
“Labour peace is essential 
to prosperity”. With an ar-
senal including; conven-
tions, declarations and pacts - it formalizes these rights, enabling members of the ILO system to 
implement these rights nationally. The legal output is founded on eight core conventions, these 
are also named the fundamental conventions which includes elements of rights at work, prohibi-
tion of child labor, right to association etc. Five of the conventions are ratified by all member 
states, however all members of the ILO and UN system has obliged themselves to follow the 
conventions set forward by the ILO - (International Labour Organization, 1998)  
Furthermore the ILO is ambitious in encouraging decent standards for workers, setting minimum 
standards in terms of social rights (right to strike, right of association), working environment etc.   
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The ILO system can be seen as a mediator between three parties, enabling a projection of social 
and labor rights, marking them with a stamp of universality. To be successful in this quest it ne-
cessitates a structure which holds the ability to connect government body, employers and em-
ployees. It does so by the unique tripartite system where all three sides are being represented. 
The tripartite system is a unique organizational structure that is only utilized by the ILO. This 
system allows for the representation of all three of the parties interested in the discussions on la-
bor. They are the two social partners i.e. the Employer’s Organization and the Worker’s Organi-
zation while the Government Body represents the member states. There are three main bodies in 
the ILO, these are the International Labour Conference, the Governing Body and the Office 
which all include employer’s workers and governmental representatives. These three in conjunc-
tion conduct the work of the ILO. 
 
The International Labour Conference 
The ILC meet once a year in Geneva, Switzerland in June. This is the main forum of the ILO as 
it is also sometimes referred to as an international parliament of labor (ILO.org, 2015). They 
adopt new international labor standards as well as approve the yearly ILO budget. Here each 
member state is represented by two government delegates, an employer and a worker delegate 
with their respective advisors. Often the government delegates are the cabinet ministers put in 
charge of labor affairs in their respective countries while employers and workers delegates are 
nominated based on who is the most representative organization respectively. All of the dele-
gates possess the same rights and are free to vote as well as to express themselves (ILO.org, 
2015).  
Their main tasks consist of the following; 
- Creation and adoption of international labor standards in the form of Conventions and 
Recommendations 
- Supervision of the application of Conventions and Recommendations based on the yearly 
report submitted by governments 
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- Since 1998, the examination of the Global Report, a report consisting of the four funda-
mental rights, every four years. The four fundamental rights are; (a) freedom of associa-
tion and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination 
of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; (c) the effective abolition of child labor; and 
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. (ILO.org, 
2015) 
- Serves as a forum in which social and labor questions can be discussed globally. The cen-
tral theme of the discussion is set by the ILO’s Director-General 
- Also passes resolutions that are providing guidelines for general policy making in the 
ILO 
- Every two years they approve the budget which is financed by member states 
 
The Governing Body 
The Governing Body is essentially the executive body of the ILO. They meet three times a year 
in March, June and November. It is composed of 56 regular members (28 governments, 14 em-
ployers, 14 workers) and 66 deputy members (28 governments, 19 employers and 19 workers). 
Their main tasks are taking decisions on ILO policy, deciding the agenda for the ILC, adopting 
the draft of the budget that is afterwards submitted to the conference as well as electing the Di-
rector-General. 
The Office 
The International Labour Office is the permanent secretariat of the ILO who are under the au-
thority of the Governing Body and are essentially the centerpiece of the ILO (ILO.org, 2015). 
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1.  A Does the structure hinder it from achieving its mission? 
The tripartite structure of the ILO is arguably a unique one in fact it is the only tripartite system 
under the UN. This provides an interesting challenge to IR theories as many of them are based on 
the assumption that organizational change comes from outside pressure in the form of states as 
well as non-state actors (NSA) (Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy, 2000). However, in the case of the 
ILO as it has been described above, governmental representatives are not the only ones repre-
sented in the organization but instead there are two more actors involved i.e. the social partners. 
The workers and employers organizations are represented in the organization and are an essential 
part of furthering the social dialogue on labor issues. Social dialogue is, according to the ILO 
website,  
“Social dialogue includes all types of negotiation, consultation and exchange of infor-
mation between, or among, representatives of governments, employers and workers on 
issues of common interest.” (ILO.org, 2015) 
The theoretical framework put forth by Barnett and Finnemore aids us in adapting to such a dif-
ferent organizational system by treating it as a bureaucracy. As a bureaucracy the ILO is consid-
ered to be hierarchic as everyone possesses their own sphere of influence and role. The Govern-
ment Body rarely involves itself in disputes between the social partners as it not their role to be 
the mediator between them (Engmann, 2015).  
The bureaucratic rules of the ILO also constrain the ways the social partners can conduct the ne-
gotiations. For instance, at the very beginning of the dispute in 2012, at the ILC, everyone was 
caught by surprise when the employer’s organization voiced their concerns regarding convention 
87 regarding the right to strike (Engmann, 2015). According to ILO rules and procedures, the Di-
rector-General sets the agenda of the ILC meetings which were seemingly ignored by the em-
ployer’s organization. The tripartite structure of the ILO does not allow for deviation from una-
nimity i.e. if one of the parties disagrees a dispute arises from which they cannot move forward 
until it has been resolved. In this specific case, it took about three years to reach some form of 
solution which has to be pointed out as a temporary solution. They essentially pushed aside the 
problem for a later date by “agreeing to disagree”. This exact term was used by all of our inter-
viewees when discussing this subject. The Governing Body of the ILO, displaying a to some ex-
tent poor form of activity in regards to the dispute, had the goals of resolving the dispute as 
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quickly as possible and as cheaply as possible (Engmann, 2015). Therefore the Joint Statement 
was created in between the social partners which “solved” the dispute for the time being. Regard-
ing the original working question of whether the structure itself is actually hindering further co-
operation, the Government Body believes that only a tripartite solution will provide a permanent 
solution for the dispute (Engmann, 2015). However, it is arguably why the dispute came about in 
the first place as the dispute took place at the ILC tripartite meeting. However, it is also arguable 
whether or not the structure of the ILO actually had anything to do with the dispute as the em-
ployer’s organization were the only ones not abiding by the agenda set forth by the Director-
General. The interviewees from the Government Body also mentioned the fact that the dispute 
came when “the system was a bit fragile” when the new Director-General, Guy Ryder took up 
his position (Engmann, 2015).  
Barnett and Finnemore did not include this factor in their theoretical framework. However, to 
provide an extension to their framework, we can see that some parts of an organization can take 
advantage of organizational weakness to gain a positional advantage. It is possible they were try-
ing to further their agenda in other cases while the focus of attention was on the dispute they 
caused. The 2x2 matrix provided by Barnett and Finnemore do not account for a part of the or-
ganization attempting to halt further cooperation. It can be characterized as external stimulus as 
it is the employers organization causing the deadlock, however they are also a part of the internal 
structure of the ILO. This is the reason why the ILO tripartite system is unique as the actors 
within the organization also have external agendas which cannot necessarily be accounted for. 
Therefore taking the matrix a step further incorporate the events that are not explained at the 
ILO, we propose that organizational change can also come from the internal parts of the organi-
zation with an external agenda. The tripartite constituents interviewed all, but the ER, shared this 
knowledge that the employer’s organization had a somewhat ‘hidden agenda’ in causing the 
deadlock (Engmann, Lyngse, Ohrt - 2015). As the tripartite system is composed of three separate 
bodies it is undeniable that they possess different agendas. Most of Barnett and Finnemore’s 
framework focuses on organizational change that would benefit the organization as a whole such 
as gaining more funding, expanding their mandate, etc., however this is not the case in the ILO 
since the past three years. This might be an inherent flaw of the tripartite system as the social 
partners are relentless in achieving their own interests and goals as shown in the deadlock, which 
the employers also expresses as: 
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  “Both workers and employer’s representatives have been fighting for three years, and 
some of my colleagues and colleagues from trade unions have loved this fight, invested a lot in 
this fight. And now they are being told; we are not fighting any longer, and demobilizing armies 
both private and public is difficult - it will take some time (Rønnest, 2015). 
 
This quote is remarkable, in that it confirms both the historical relationship between the social 
partners, as well as their discursive behavior in the dispute, at least to some extent. It also con-
firms the hypothesis that structural components of the ILO, is to some extent hindering its func-
tionality, in the sense that Bureaucracy, suggested by Barnett and Finnemore, is indeed present in 
the Tripartite. Applying the matrix from Barnett & Finnemore, see page 19, one can assume that 
the discursive dispute amongst the social power is as much a cultural battle, as a political one. 
Chris Syder, a front figure from the UK, representing employer’s, has in a YouTube interview 
(Syder, 2011), expressed that it was an “unfair fight” referring to the strong unions in EU and 
their high level of international cooperation. Mr. Rønnest does also acknowledge this tendency, 
and states that the ILO has to a great extent been for workers, and there is a need to balance the 
scale (Rønnest, 2015). As suggested by Barnett & Finnemore, this sort of internal conflict, re-
sults in enactment of new rules and norms, catalyzing an organizational change. This bears much 
resemblance to the Disclaimer in 2013, and the Joint Statement in 2015, which both were enact-
ment of new settings and rules, attempting to balance the ideals and power of employers and 
workers.  
Taken point of departure in sociological institutionalism, one could assume that change, to some 
extent, comes as a response to normative change in the environment. Following this assumption, 
one can state that ILO can only function if changes are in conformity with the ideals and norms it 
internally establishes. This does however also imply that the difference in culture has to be em-
braced to a certain extent by the tripartite, as all constituents agree on the only way forward is the 
tripartite-way. (Ohrt, Rønnest, Engmann - 2015). The Joint Statement is moreover a sign of a 
more autonomous ILO - in the very sense that it once again tries to enact new norms to progress, 
even without governmental support. This does however, not correspond with the expressions 
from the social partners; “Government actions is needed, and vital for ILO future” (Rønnest. 
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Ohrt - 2015). How can the need for governmental action be important, when social partners act 
autonomously, without consulting the tripartite and by that the GB? This question will be dis-
cussed in the third question. 
 
They were unable to come to an agreement for three years which shows that they both have dif-
ferent sets of goals. This is trivial however because the ILO was essentially created as a forum 
between the social partners so it is, technically speaking, doing its intended responsibility. There-
fore, we argue that the structure of the ILO is indeed hindering it from its mission as the social 
partners inherently do not agree on some issues hence the creation of this international forum. 
However, as mentioned before, the new Director-General taking his position also had an impact 
on why the deadlock appeared (Orht, Engmann, 2015). A deadlock such as this one has not hap-
pened before, therefore it is conceivable that the ILO tripartite structure is only part of the prob-
lem. Had the system not been so fragile, as the GB interviewees mentioned, this impasse might 
not have happened. Therefore, is the dispute only caused by the tripartite structure? - Or is it 
caused by the bureaucratic nature of the ILO where they are bound by rules and are routinized? 
Barnett and Finnemore state that bureaucratic culture entails that tasks become routinized and 
therefore, predictable. An example of this is when a new Director-General takes over from 
his/her predecessor. There is a routine procedure for how the new leader of the organization 
takes up the mantle. The subunits of the organization can therefore take advantage of said routine 
by pushing their own agenda when they are in an advantageous position as the system is weak. 
 
An intriguing aspect that Jørgen Rønnest mentioned in the interview was that they struck the deal 
i.e. the Joint Statement because the social partners all agreed that the ILO cannot lose its rele-
vance as the international labor forum. As stated in Barnett and Finnemore’s framework, the 
leaders as well as the members of an IO, are constantly striving to create more rules to strengthen 
their organization’s position. This is arguably also true when talking about internal issues that 
cease the supervisory functions of the organization. Therefore, the members, being loyal to the 
ILO, are proceeding in agreement to ensure the survival of the organization (Rønnest, J. 2015). 
This of course also includes funding which the ILO receives from the member states. If the so-
cial partners cannot come to an agreement the ILO will cease to exist as there will be no funding. 
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In some sense this can be seen as unintended external pressure from states to force the social 
partners to come to an agreement. The autonomy of the ILO also comes into questions as it is es-
sentially states that force them to come to an agreement.  
 
The third point in the autonomy section of the theoretical framework states that IOs often ‘make 
promises’ they cannot necessarily keep. This dispute has been an ongoing issue since 1994 but it 
was not voiced so strongly by the employers until 2012. It took three years from then to actually 
come to some form of agreement, which points to the fact that general bureaucratic slowness is 
present in the actions of the social partners. However, when discussing the autonomy of the ILO 
it is crucial to mention that the governments were actually furious when the social partners in-
volved them in the dispute (Ohrt, 2015). The autonomy of the ILO seems to be at its peak as the 
social partners are essentially forcing the governments to take a stance and become “a part of the 
problem and a part of the solution as well” (Ohrt, 2015). Mr. Rønnest said several times that the 
right to strike and the means of enforcing it is an issue for national governments and not an issue 
for the ILO. To further strengthen the argument he said there are no international strikes, as all 
strikes occur at a national level, there might be sympathy strikes abroad but it is still on the na-
tional level therefore it needs to be regulated on the national level (Rønnest, 2015). However the 
worker’s organization believes this is an issue that needs to be addressed on the international 
level by social dialogue (Ohrt, 2015). A good example of a case was brought up by Mr. Ohrt dur-
ing the interview it was mentioned that if the workers in Cambodia are not satisfied with their 
employers their “only weapon is striking” as workers trying to start a social dialogue will not en-
gage the employers. To this Mr. Rønnest responded: the police should imprison them as it is ille-
gal to strike (Ohrt, 2015). Therefore, it is once again the tripartite structure, or rather the oppos-
ing social partners that are hindering the work of the ILO as well as the governments’ reluctance 
to engage in the social dialogue.  
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2. How did the social partners, through the Joint Statement, reclassify the discus-
sion of the CEACR mandate and is this a sign of organizational change? 
 
The entire conflict is based on the fact that the employer’s organization does not recognize the 
mandate of the CEACR in interpreting ILO conventions. They believe they exceeded their man-
date when interpreting one of the core Conventions (Ohrt, 2015). 
The CEACR is subject to the ILO given mandate by the Governing Body to supervise whether 
the member states are abiding by ratified treaties. It is stated, specifically, that they are do not 
possess the legislative power to make ‘definitive interpretations’ of core Conventions. This is the 
role of the International Court of Justice. In this case, the Governing Body were hoping that the 
social partners would be able to resolve the dispute on their own without needing to go to the ICJ 
(Engmann, Orht, Rønnest 2015). That road was the last resort as it would be a lengthy and costly 
one to go down. An interesting aspect, yet again, is that the tripartite structure of the ILO pre-
sents an issue as one of the powers of an IO is the classification of the world and fixing of mean-
ings (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). However, in this case the authority of the CEACR is under-
mined by a subunit of the ILO i.e. the employer’s organization. This also forces the ILO into a 
difficult position as their authority to classify the world is undermined from the inside of the or-
ganization. The interesting aspect is that the ILO has all the types of authority that Barnett and 
Finnemore mention. Delegated authority derives from the fact that the League of Nations set up 
the ILO with the mandate to provide social justice to the world. Moral authority stems from the 
fact that the ILO is claiming to be the protector of worker’s rights and has achieved quite a num-
ber of successes in for instance the abolition of child labor. Lastly, they are authoritative because 
of their sheer expertise in the field. All the representative organizations of the ILC have been 
trained in labor specific contexts and are experts on their own as well. 
 
Therefore the questions arise, what may be the consequences if the CEACR’s mandate is not rec-
ognized by parts of the organization itself? A temporary solution was the Joint Statement re-
leased by the social partners after the meeting in February, 2015. What the Joint Statement did 
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was to clarify the mandate of the CEACR which does not include providing ‘definitive interpre-
tations’ of Conventions (International Labour Organization, 2015). The mandate of the CEACR 
remains the same i.e. being a supervisory body overseeing the implementation of International 
Labour Standards in all the member states. However, an interesting aspect of the Joint Statement 
was that the term ‘right to strike’ is entirely excluded but instead they chose to incorporate the 
term ‘right to take industrial action’.  
This is where the power of classification and fixing of meanings of an IO is seen. As the issue 
was revolving around the term ‘right to strike’, the social partners decided to reclassify the term 
to ‘right to industrial action’. According to the Cambridge Dictionary industrial action is:  an oc-
casion when workers do something that is intended to force an employer to agree to something, 
especially by stopping work (Industrial action definition, 2015) while a strike is:  to refuse to 
continue working because of an argument with an employer about working conditions, pay lev-
els, or job losses (Strike definition, 2015). 
As concepts play a large part of the social partner dispute, we have developed the following ma-
trix to operationalize these concepts - what do they imply, what is the connotation and how are 
they changing and challenging the work of the ILO? 
We must understand these concepts, as they are an outcome of the social interactions between 
the social partners, as well as an outcome of the interaction between the structure and its actors. 
These concepts can be perceived as blocks of social scientific inquiry, in the sense that they en-
compass the ‘clash’ between structure, bureaucracy, interests and essentially the pressure from 
outside the organizations environment.  
The right to strike, is part of Convention 87: Freedom of Association - as mentioned previously, 
it is one of the 8 core conventions. This does not only imply the importance of C.87, it makes it a 
part of an international legal framework, in which the member states are bound to follow and re-
spect. The Committee of Experts interpreted the following wording of C.87:  
 
 “Workers’ and employers’ organizations shall have the right… to organize their admin-
istration and activities and to formulate their programmes”, continued: “for furthering and de-
fending the interests of workers or of employers”.  
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From this interpretation they derived that the right to strike was included in both Article 3 and 10 
of Convention 87, as the formulation of their programmes as well as defending the interests of 
their members, could not be fully realized without a right to strike. After three years of a not op-
timal supervisory system, the GB stated in a conclusion from a tripartite meeting in February;  
 
“The Government Group specifically recognizes that without protecting a right to strike, Free-
dom of Association, in particular the right to organize activities for the purpose of promoting 
and protecting workers’ interests, cannot be fully realized”. (International Labour Office, 2015) 
 
Figure 4 - Industrial action and the right to strike 
This indicates that there is an internationally recognized strike right, but it does not mention any-
thing about industrial action. If we take a look at Figure 4, we can see that the right to strike from 
a worker’s perspective is both national and international, as pointed out by the CEACR and GB. 
However, the wording the right to take industrial action is connected to the employers. Implying 
that this right can then be internationally placed is a causal link to the right to strike, according to 
the matrix. In order words, if a social right in an ILO context, have the connotation of being in-
ternational, it must then have a characteristic of being ‘derived from a convention’? The interest-
ing aspect of this discussion, is the fact that Industrial action was an outcome of the Joint State-
ment, which has no legal jurisprudence, but merely a statement of compromise from the social 
partners: “The right to take industrial action by workers and employers in support of their legiti-
mate industrial interests is recognized by the constituents of the International Labour Organisa-
tion” (International Labour Office, 2015).  
What is meant by industrial action depends on the context. In striking cases, the connotation of 
industrial action would refer to protected and unprotected industrial action as well as industrial 
action being something which is taken by employers or employees to” settle a workplace dispute 
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about working conditions. (Fairwork.gov.au, 2015)  
It includes when workers: 
● fail, or refuse to perform any work at all 
● delay or put a ban or limit on the work they do 
● are locked out of a workplace by their employer. 
Insofar a new collective agreement is being negotiated and fails, industrial action, ‘protected’, 
can legally be taken if it meets certain requirements, some of these are: 
● The existing agreement has passed its nominal expiry date 
● Parties involved, has genuinely tried to reach an agreement 
● The notice requirement for action has been met 
All other industrial actions is unprotected and therefore illegal will have repercussions for the in-
volved parties. 
 
Figure 5 - Connotations and Denotations of Industrial Action 
According to figure 5 the denotation suggests it is a means to settle a labor-related dispute, as 
well as being in conformity with national requirements. Whereas the connotation would be the 
symbolics of changing or switching the word strike with action, as well as discursive connota-
tions of the word industrial, implying, for instance, sector related work. These showcase, as Mr. 
Ohrt and Mr. Rønnest both mentioned, that the word ‘strike’ was to some extent forbidden to use 
by employers. This furthermore implies that an outside pressure, to some extent, had an impact 
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on the discourse applied by the employers. As Jens Ohrt and Jørgen Rønnest mentioned; “Every-
thing is strategically planned by Business Europe”. The fact that Business Europe lobbies, is not 
surprising, as both workers and employers have interests to safeguard and promote. The interest-
ing elements, are of both structural and literal format, in the sense that the concept industrial ac-
tion was accepted by the social partners. 
On the 28th of April, at an LO conference on the matters of the right to strike, it was discussed 
whether the right to take industrial action was an acceptable deal for the workers. Individuals 
both from the CFA and worker representatives were present to discuss if industrial action in-
cluded the “Lock Out”, which in many of the MS, is excluded from the ratification of C.87. They 
did not agree if the “lock out” was included, or if simply the word strike could be changed with 
industrial action. In light of this, one can confirm the relevance analyzing the dispute, since ac-
tors in both camps are indicating similar thoughts as well as disagreements. 
It seems that the social partners are, once again, attempting to put the issue aside by labeling it 
something else and setting a next meeting where they will discuss the issue again. However, the 
Joint Statement also mentions that this is a possible way forward and all the tripartite constitu-
ents are satisfied that they came to some form of agreement to cease the deadlock (Rønnest, 
Orht, and Engmann - 2015).  
 
To summarize: industrial action was used in that it connotes national regulation, and not inter-
national regulation, which the employers oppose (Rønnest, 2015). Industrial action then becomes 
a mediator between the social partners, because of the context it is applied in. It is acceptable to 
employers since it does not, to some extent, relate to the idea of international regulation. It be-
came acceptable for workers, in that they perceived industrial action, in short terms, to be a prob-
lem-solver, just as the Disclaimer were in 2013. This indicates similar fragilities in the social dia-
logue, in that the Joint Statement is not a tripartite solution, and the word industrial action does 
not correspond to the right to strike, and therefore not derived from C.87. Institutional Stagnation 
is characterized by exactly such behavior, and from an historical institutionalist perspective, one 
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may say that the ILO, as an IO, have become more politicized during the stagnation, which in-
creases the possibilities for such disagreements to happen again.  
 
Returning to the structure, the CEACR, being a subunit of the ILO is also a bureaucratic element 
therefore they are given authority, as well as moral authority, delegated by the ILO, as they have 
been an important part of the supervisory system of the ILO for 85 years (International Labour 
Office, 2015). Additionally they possess a high level of expertise, thus providing even more au-
thority. However, the issue in the dispute was that the employer’s organization felt the CEACR 
overstepped their mandate in the interpretation of C.87. As mentioned before, the CEACR can-
not provide interpretations that are binding, only the ICJ can. The worker’s organization at-
tempted to pursue this issue by going to the ICJ but that would mean that the supervisory system 
of the ILO would not function for about one and a half a year (Ohrt, 2015). Therefore the case 
was not taken to the ICJ instead the Joint Statement was released clarifying the mandate of the 
CEACR.  
As the theoretical framework suggest, bureaucracies, such as the ILO, show a tendency to create 
rules and make decisions which allows for further intervention. In this case, the Joint Statement 
needs to be reviewed in a year however it is arguable whether it is because they needed to come 
to an agreement, as described above, or because the bureaucrats at the ILO want to have further 
influence on the issue.  
However, we must also reflect on the quote from the Government Body interview who firstly 
recognized that the employer’s organization challenged the legitimacy of the CEACR, and went 
on:  
“Academically speaking, you can always distinguish between literal and dynamic interpretations 
of conventions”…” in the sense of the CEACR there is a level of dynamic interpretation yes, and 
it would not really make sense to have any different” (Engmann, Lorentzen, 2015)  
This implies that, from a member state perspective, there is an understanding of the CEACR’s 
dynamic interpretation of C.87, thus legitimating the discussion and analysis of the employer’s 
stand in this dispute. The report from the tripartite meeting in February included a Statement by 
the Nordic Countries, where an international right to strike, derived from C.87, was accepted to 
full extent, also labelled as a general right (International Labour Organization, 2015). Along 
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with the support of EU, the employers has to this point in time, been pressured to accept this in-
terpretation of the CEACR.  
3. Taking point of departure in the rejection of the right to strike, how may solu-
tions be applied to solve this dilemma between employer and employees at an ILO 
level? 
 
This dispute dates back to the 1994 General Survey (see timeline) where the Employer’s Organi-
zation has already voiced their concerns over the wording of Convention 87 as it does not in-
clude the right to strike. However, no steps were taken to confront this issue so it has been set 
aside until 2012 where the Employer’s Organization once again raised its voice in this issue. The 
dispute lasted for three years until a temporary solution presented itself in the Joint Statement, it 
is temporary as it needs to be renewed in a year. However, the Joint Statement also set up a new 
body of the ILO called the SRM. This seems to be a viable solution to the revision of outdated 
Conventions and Recommendations. However, they were not granted the mandate to revise the 
Fundamental Conventions. The dispute between the social partners merely seems like an issue of 
legal wording at least according to them (Ohrt. 2015). By granting the power to actually interpret 
or revise the Fundamental Conventions instead of relying on another International Organization, 
the ILO could solve this dilemma in-house. This inherently requires a tremendous amount of re-
sources and a depoliticized and highly trained staff of the SRM. A depoliticized staff can be 
achieved both through a reestablishment of social dialogue, which to some extent has been left 
out during the Dispute, due to the bureaucratic elements we have identified in the ILO. The tri-
partite constituents all refer to the most permanent solution as a tripartite one, however both the 
Disclaimer in 2013, and the Joint Statement in 2015, have showcased an internal and external 
change which impacted the functioning of the supervisory system as well as the structural integ-
rity of the ILO. 
 
Our empirical data suggests that the International Labour Organization cannot function without 
its supervisory system. Furthermore it emphasizes a need to reestablish social dialogue, which in 
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the latter years has portrayed a fight and contest for power, instead of a constructive setting, fa-
cilitating the ILO objectives. Tracing the legal output from the ILO throughout the last 20 years, 
we can conclude that fewer conventions are being agreed on that ever before, as well as the gen-
eral surveys and reports by the epistemic communities are becoming smaller and smaller. This is 
caused by a need for change, primarily pursued by employers, as they have called the struggle 
amongst other things “an unfair fight” (Syder, 2011). This also confirms the assumption that 
Business Europe has a motivated and influential actor, which to a great extent has facilitated the 
discourse applied by employers (Rønnest, Ohrt, 2015). Furthermore it can be confirmed that in-
tentional actors have had an impact on the impasse from 2012-2015. These intentional actors 
have the capability as well as the support from their organizations. An example is Chris Syder, 
who in 2011 replaced Ed Potter as spokesperson for employer in the Committee on the Applica-
tion of Labour Standards. Placed in the same committee is John Kloosterman, as well as other 
prominent lawyers, representing employers, their discourse and finally their stand in the dispute 
on convention 87. This replacement of actors has been a factor in decreasing the social dialogue, 
making the ILO’s most successful instrument for solving disputes inapplicable. The replacement 
is however, also unexpected as the subject is of a jurisprudence character, thus lawyers replacing 
businessmen. It is interesting to study the relationship between the constantly change of actors, 
lawyers, employers etc., and see how it influences the discourse, thus the right to strike changed 
with the right to take industrial actions. As the theoretical framework by Barnett and Finnemore 
suggests, IOs have impartial and depoliticized members who are experts in their respective 
fields. However, appointing lawyers who are known as ‘union busters’ seems to defeat the pur-
pose of a depoliticized international forum therefore presenting another issue for the ILO struc-
ture. 
 
The origins on which the ILO was founded on, explicitly prescribed social dialogue as the me-
dium of solving disputes between the tripartite constituents. The 2012-2015 dispute is not differ-
ent, only in the sense that the social dialogue exercised failed. In a report published by ILO (Na-
tional Tripartite Social Dialogue, 2013) a guideline of, how to improve the governance of social 
dialogue, was formulated.  
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“Without proper implementation, social dialogue might be perceived as just a “talking exercise” 
that does not lead to any concrete outcomes. The implementation itself should also be monitored 
and evaluated.” (National Tripartite Social Dialogue, pg. 37, 2013) 
 
A solution could be a newly created body or revising the mandate of the CEACR by extending 
their legal power to include ‘definitive interpretations’ of Fundamental Conventions. The ICJ 
should confer legislative authority upon the CEACR. For instance, in European Union law, when 
a national court is in doubt of EU legislation they have the power to take the case to the EU 
Court of Justice for a clear interpretation. The same should apply for the CEACR in the ILO, as 
it is an international organization functioning on the basis of international law. As the ICJ is the 
only international legislative body it is therefore in their sphere of competence to give interpreta-
tions to international organizations.  The International Labour Standards are treated as compo-
nents of international law, whereas the ICJ is the supreme authority. Therefore we propose that 
the CEACR should have their mandate extended to request for interpretations at any point with-
out the approval of the tripartite constituents and therefore be treated as a preliminary ruling 
from the ICJ - which is also the case of EU law. This united body would possess legal authority 
over all International Labour Standards. 
This would furthermore fit together with the theoretical framework which required that the mem-
bers of an IO are impartial and depoliticized, creating a similar composition of the CEACR as it 
is today, one with jurist and legal experts who possess the legal competences of the ICJ.  
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Conclusion 
The ILO is experiencing an organizational change which is originating from within the organiza-
tion as a result of the social dispute. This change led the ILO to come to an impasse in terms of 
strike cases as the supervisory system could not function. The social partners needed to find a so-
lution so work could resume normally. The Government Body did not want to get involved in the 
conflict, but it has been indicated by the constituents that such a conflict can only be solved 
through tripartite decisions. However, first and foremost, the Joint Statement, that solved the dis-
pute temporarily, is also not a tripartite solution as the GB did not have any part in it. It is neither 
signed by any legal authorities or the Governing Body. It is simply an agreement between the so-
cial partners so the normal work of the supervisory system could resume. Our proposal is there-
fore also not a tripartite solution but instead a further conferral of powers upon a subunit of the 
ILO by the ICJ. This subunit being the CEACR which consists of impartial legal experts already 
could be expanded with some representatives from the ICJ who would therefore have the legal 
authority in all cases brought to the CEACR. These may be interpretations as well as states not 
abiding by ILS, the CEACR should possess the legal authority to take action in such cases to fur-
ther the work of the ILO smoothly. 
 
The organizational change is moreover underpinned by the classification of ideas taken place in 
the ILO, especially seen in the Joint Statement wherein the right to strike, was changed with the 
right to take industrial action (see figure 4). It is clear that the social dialogue has failed, and that 
employers’ to some extent have challenged the legitimacy of the CEACR mandate at a time of 
fragility. Furthermore it can also be concluded that all constituents of the tripartite system, recog-
nizes the importance of the supervisory system, and are determined to take measures to solve this 
dispute. The question then is, has it been solved? The Joint Statement is, following the theoreti-
cal framework of this paper, a temporary solution, which has the connotations of fixed meanings 
and classification of ideas. In other words, through the Joint Statement in 2015, and the Dis-
claimer in 2013, the ILO showcases bureaucratic tendencies, which prevents them from reaching 
their ideals as an IO.  
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The ILO is arguably a reflection of the changing tendencies in the global labor market. The num-
ber of members of ILO has increased massively since its origins, and therefore the ILO has to 
keep developing its objectives, and update their conventions, so they can be in conformity with 
this international change. It must also be mentioned that in a time with more free trade agree-
ments (FTA) than ever before, ILO is experiencing an even larger exogenous pressure than it did 
when C.87 was adopted in 1948.  The discussion of regulation vs. deregulation is apparent in 
most Member States, and organizations such as the employers, have a natural interest in making 
it easier to conduct business globally. As Bas Arts states, non-state-actor (NSAs) have increased 
with this development, and therefore they also become part of epistemic committees such as the 
ones in ILO (Arts, 2003). This change in actors, showcase that different interest, perhaps more 
conflictual interests are at play in ILO. The ILO in that sense reflects the tendencies which sur-
rounds it, but attempts to provide tangible solutions through social dialogue, a dialogue which is 
being challenged by NSA’s.  
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Afterthoughts 
 
Studying the ILO from an organizational perspective, as well as including elements of structure 
and agency, we had a balanced stand to answer our research question. It came naturally for us to 
challenge the rational choice and state-centric approaches that assumed states were the driving 
force of IOs as we hypothesized change was not only external but internal. In regards to the data 
collection, it proved to be quite complementary to combine participant observation with expert 
interviews, as it gave us an insight of both the tripartite setting and its actors. In retrospect the 
participant observation could have provided more detailed pieces of information on behavior, 
culture and interest, if we would have observed over a longer period, as the dispute is ongoing 
and changing constantly.  
 
Another theoretical framework which could have been utilized is institutional history by Niels 
Åkerstrøm Andersen. That would have required us to look at a longer period of time and search 
for ‘ruptures’ in time. These ruptures would have provided us with instances where the discourse 
changed within the organization and thereby provide us with insights as to why it happened. This 
approach fits together with the methodology of process tracing as it is the most essential part of 
institutional history. If we were to have had unlimited resources and time, we could have con-
ducted interviews with representatives outside Denmark, and even outside Europe. It most defi-
nitely would have provided a different perspective if we were to look at this issue by interview-
ing Latin-American representatives for instance. They do not possess the amount of unionization 
as Denmark does, so the discourse there would be completely different. We also could have 
delved deeper into external pressures, such as the ones mentioned in the conclusion, to actually 
provide an account of how much influence the external actors possess in this case.  
 
 
In regards to the academic contribution of this report, we place the output of this report in the 
fields of both political science and international relations. First, political science, because ILO 
has become more politicized due to the external pressure. Secondly, because the ILO is experi-
encing organizational change caused by both endogenous and exogenous parameters. Insofar we 
have had a focal point on the endogenous parameters, namely the social partners’ dispute and the 
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structure of the ILO. We have challenged the state-centric approach, and argued change cannot 
be reduced to external factors, a comprehensive understanding of both structure and agency are 
necessary to give credible explanations to the social partner dispute, as well as recommending 
permanent solutions.   
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